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Cooperation is a major factor in the evolution of human societies. The structure of human social
networks, which affects the dynamics of cooperation and other interpersonal phenomena, have com-
mon structural signatures. One of these signatures is the tendency to organize as groups. Among
the generative models that network theorists use to emulate this feature is the Stochastic Block
Model (SBM). In this paper, we study evolutionary game dynamics on SBM networks. Using a
recently-discovered duality between evolutionary games and coalescing random walks, we obtain
analytical conditions such that natural selection favors cooperation over defection. We calculate the
transition point for each community to favor cooperation. We find that a critical inter-community
link creation probability exists for given group density, such that the overall network supports coop-
eration even if individual communities inhibit it. As a byproduct, we present mean-field solutions
for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio which performs with remarkable accuracy for diverse generative
network models, including those with community structure and heavy-tailed degree distributions.
We also demonstrate the generalizability of the results to arbitrary two-player games.
Cooperation is a central tenet of social life of many
species. Cooperative dynamics are affected by the struc-
ture of social networks they take place on [1–4]. A ubiq-
uitous feature of social networks, including human social
networks, is community structure, which involves the
tendency of nodes to have different intergroup and in-
tragroup connectivity [5]. Previous studies have demon-
strated the effects of such group structures. A common
model to generate and study community structure and
to perform community detection is the Stochastic Block
Model (SBM) [6–8]. Here we study the evolutionary
dynamics of arbitrary symmetric 2×2 games on SBM
networks. We find analytical results such that natu-
ral selection would favor one strategy over the other.
We introduce a mean-field approximation that produces
remarkably-accurate solutions which perform reasonably
well even when the network size is as small as 20. We uti-
lize the solutions to study how inter-connection of seggre-
gated communities under the SBM framework affects the
fate of cooperation in the whole network. We highlight
that our results give analytical support to the previous
studies in the literature which demonstrated the effect of
inter-group connectivity on the evolution of cooperation
with diverse simulation setups and model settings [9–12].
Together, these findings evince a robust phenomenon re-
garding how inter-group connectivity affects collective
cooperation. We conclude by demonstrating that the
proposed solutions perform remarkably well for network
models other than SBM, including those with heavy-
tailed degree distributions.
We consider a generic 2 × 2 game with two available
strategies, C and D. Both players receive R if they mu-
tually play C, and receive P if they mutually play D. If
one player plays C and the other plays D, the C-player
receives S and the D-player receives T . The strategy of
node x is denoted by sx ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 corresponds to
strategy C and 0 to strategy D. We denote the set of net-
work neighbors of node x by Nx. We consider averaged
payoffs, where the payoff of node x is given by
fx =
∑
y∈Nx
sx
[
Rsy + S(1− sy)
]
+ (1− sx)
[
Tsy + P (1− sy)
]
.
(1)
At each timestep, a random individual is chosen to up-
date its strategy via copying that of a neighbor. The
probability that neighbor x is copied is proportional to
1+δfx, where fx is the payoff of x and 0 < δ  1 models
the selection strength, that is, higher δ indicates stronger
social learning via observing the payoff of peers. The
case δ = 0 is equivalent to the voter model [13–15]. The
weak-selection limit considered here can be viewed as
the first-order correction to the voter model. We seek
an analytical condition such that natural selection fa-
vors the fixation of C over fixation of D. According to
the Structure Coefficient Theorem [16], this happens if
(R− P )σ > (T − S), where σ is the structure coefficient,
which is independent of the game and only depends on
the network structure. Thus, it suffices to calculate σ
for the given network. This can be done exactly by con-
sidering a mathematical equivalence between the evolu-
tionary game dynamics and that of coalescing random
walks [17]. Below we briefly outline this recent exact
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
03
09
3v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 9 
Ju
l 2
01
8
2framework, highlight the computational cost of the so-
lution for very large networks, propose a mean-field ap-
proximation to ameliorate the situation for large net-
works, and then apply this mean-field solution to obtain
remarkably accurate solutions for SBM networks. After
analyzing the case of SBM networks in detail, we con-
clude by pointing out the reasonable performance of the
proposed mean-field solution for a wide array of other
network models.
To obtain σ for generic 2 × 2 games, we apply the
methodology of [17] to unweighted undirected graphs.
We analyze the ‘donation game’ version of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, with R = b− 1, S = −1, T = b, and P = 0
and later discuss how σ can be readily derived from the
results. The payoff of node x is given by:
fx(t) = −csx(t) + 1
kx
∑
y∈Nx
bsy(t). (2)
For the update of node x, the following holds:
E [sx(t+ 1)] = (1− 1
N
)sx(t)
+
1
N
∑
y∈Nx
1 + δfy(t)∑
z∈Nx [1 + δfz(t)]
sy(t). (3)
In the limit of weak selection, expanding to the first order
of δ after multiplying both sides by kx, we get:
E [kxsx(t+ 1)] =
1
N
[ ∑
y∈Nx
sy(t) + δ
∑
y∈Nx
fy(t)sy(t)
−
∑
y,z∈Nx
δ
sy(t)fz(t)
kx
]
+O(δ2) + (1− 1
N
)kxsx(t). (4)
Now we define ψ(t) :=
∑
x kxsx(t). Summing (4) over
all nodes, we see that in the zeroth-order dynamics of
the system (i.e., δ = 0, corresponding to the voter
model), the expected value of ψ(t) is a conserved quan-
tity [13, 15, 18]. The fixation probability can be obtained
by equating the average value of ψ over every initial mu-
tant placement with its expected value as t → ∞. The
expected first-order change of ψ is
∆ψ(1)(~s) =
δ
N
[∑
x
∑
y∈Nx
fysy −
∑
x
∑
y,z∈Nx
syfz
kx
]
=
δ
N
[∑
x
kxfxsx −
∑
x
∑
y,z∈Nx
syfz
kx
]
=
δ
N
∑
x
[
kxsx
(
− csx + b
kx
∑
y∈Nx
sy
)
−
∑
y,z∈Nx
sy
(
− csz + bkz
∑
w∈Nz sw
)
kx
]
(5)
Exchanging the summation order, denoting the first mo-
ment of the degree distribution (the average degree) by
µ1, we get
∆ψ(1)(~s) = − δ
N
c(Nµ1) +
δ
N
∑
y
[
b
∑
x∈Ny
sysx
+ c
∑
x∈Ny
∑
z∈Nx
sysz
kx
− b
∑
x∈Ny
∑
z∈Nx
∑
w∈Nz
sysw
kxkz
]
.
(6)
We need to sum up these expected increments from t = 0
up to t =∞. Let ξx denote this expected total change for
given initial condition in which only node x is C and all
other nodes are D . The fixation probability for a given
initial condition will then be (kx+ξx)/(Nµ1). Averaging
over all nodes, this becomes:
ρ =
1
N
+
1
N
∑
x
ξx. (7)
The sum on the right hand side of (7) requires the cal-
culation of temporal sum of the spin products on the
right hand side of (6). Note that these summations are
to be performed in the voter-model regime. That is, due
to the factor δ, we should only keep the summations in
zeroth order. In [17, 19], it is shown that for any two
nodes i and j, if we find the expected temporal sum of
1/N − sisj from t = 0 to t = ∞ under the voter-model
dynamics and then average this sum over all single-node
initial placements, the result is equal to τij/(2N), where
τij is the expected meeting time of two random walkers
initiated at nodes i and j. These meeting times follow
the following recurrence relation:
τij = τji = (1− δij)
[
1 +
1
2ki
∑
`∈Ni
τ`j +
1
2kj
∑
`∈Nj
τ`i
]
.
(8)
Thus the random walk equivalence relates the fixation
probability to the expected value of the meeting times
of two random walkers initiated one, two, and three
steps away on the network, corresponding to the three
last terms on the right hand side of Equation (6), re-
spectively. Note that the expression ‘` steps away’ here
refers to random-walk steps, rather than graph distance.
So for example, node y is ` steps away from node x if
A`xy > 0, where A
` is the `-th power of the adjacency
matrix. Using the meeting times which are the solutions
to the system of equations (8), we define the quantity τx
as the expected remeeting time of two random walkers
both initiated at node x:
τx = 1 +
1
kx
∑
y∈Nx
τyx. (9)
3We also define px =
∑
y∈Nx 1/(kxky). Using these defini-
tions, and after some algebraic simplifications, the fixa-
tion probability can be expressed in the following form:
ρ =
1
N
+
δ
2N
[
b
(∑
x
kx
Nµ1
τx − 2
)
− c(∑
x
kx
Nµ1
τxpx − 2
)]
+O(δ2).
(10)
The critical benefit-to-cost ratio for C to be favored by
natural selection is thus given by setting this fixation
probability be greater than neutral drift, which yields:
b∗ =
∑
x τxkx − 2Nµ1∑
x τxkxpx − 2Nµ1
. (11)
The drawback of this exact framework is that solv-
ing (8) requires solving a system of N(N − 1)/2 linear
equations, which can be infeasible for very large net-
works. The conventional Cholesky decomposition meth-
ods to solve this system have the complexity of order N6,
and faster techniques are mainly applicable only when
the network is sparse. So for large networks in general,
which can as well be dense, obtaining the exact solution
is computationally infeasible. To obviate this limitation,
here we seek a mean-field approximation to obtain ana-
lytical results that are computationally feasible for large
networks. We use the fact that, combining (9) and (8),
the remeeting times of these random walkers satisfy the
following equation:∑
x
k2xτx = N
2µ21. (12)
Using this equation and assuming a mean-field approxi-
mation in which every τx value is replaced by the average
value over all x, we get:
τx = N
µ21
µ2
, (13)
where µ2 is the second moment of the degree distribu-
tion. For the mean-field approximation of the fixation
probability, we plug this into (10) and obtain:
ρ ≈ 1
N
+
δ
2N
[
b
(
N
µ21
µ2
− 2)− c( µ1
µ2
∑
x
kxpx − 2
)]
(14)
Noting that
∑
x kxpx =
∑
x
∑
y∈Nx 1/ky is equal to N
for any network, we get:
ρ ≈ 1
N
+
δ
2N
[
b
(
N
µ21
µ2
− 2)− c( Nµ1
µ2
− 2)] (15)
Plugging this result into (11), we arrive at:
b∗ ≈
N − 2 µ2
µ21
N
µ1
− 2 µ2
µ21
(16)
We consider a stochastic block model [6, 7] with m
equi-probable groups, intra-community link probability
p and inter-community link probability q. For node x
with degree kx, denote the number of within-community
neighbors by kintrax and denote the number of its neigh-
bors in other communities by kinterx . For large N , the
average degree µ1, which is the expected value of kx, is
µ1 = E (kintrax ) + E (kinterx ) = p
N − 1
m
+ q(N − 1)
(
1− 1
m
)
.
(17)
Also because the inter and intra-community degree dis-
tributions are independent, the variance of k is the sum
of the variance of kintrax and the variance of k
inter
x :
var(k) = p(1− p) N − 1
m
+ q(1− q)(N − 1)
(
1− 1
m
)
.
(18)
Combining (17) and (18), we obtain µ2, which we can
insert into (15) to obtain the fixation probability. For
the critical benefit-to-cost ratio, we insert the expres-
sion for µ2 and µ1 into (16). Defining α := 1/m and
β := 1− 1/m for brevity, and after algebraic simplifica-
tions, we obtain:
b∗SBM ≈
N − 2− 2
N − 1
αp(1− p) + βq(1− q)
(αp + qβ)2
N/(N − 1)
αp + βq
− 2− 2
N − 1
αp(1− p) + βq(1− q)
(αp + βq)2
.
(19)
Figure 1 demonstrates that the approximation (19) has
relative error less than 1% for network size as small as
40. In these network sizes, the exact method can be em-
ployed in reasonable time and thereby we have a bench-
mark to assess the solutions. Figure 1 demonstrates that
for large networks, the error rate is remarkably small, so
for large networks where the exact method become pro-
hibitively constly
The special case of p = q is equivalent to the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi (ER) model [20]. Equivalently, we can set m = 1.
In this special case Equation (19) simplifies to:
b∗ER ≈
p(N2 − 3N + 4)− 2
(N − 2)(1− 2p) . (20)
Figure 2 illustrates the accuracy of the proposed mean-
field approximation (20) for ER networks. We plot 1/b∗
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FIG. 1. (Color Online) Accuracy of the proposed mean-field
approximation for b∗ as a function of N . The network generation
parameters are set to the example values of p = 0.7, q = 0.1, and
m = 3. The performance is consistently well for every parameter
configuration tried, which will be demonstrated in Figure 4.
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FIG. 2. (Color Online) Accuracy of the proposed mean-field
approximation for b∗ for ER networks as a function of link creation
probability p. As predicted by Equation (20), there is a phase
transition at p̂ = 1/2, above which natural selection does not favor
cooperation over defection regardless of the benefit-to-cost ratio.
The mean-field prediction is in agreement with the exact results.
instead of b∗ because it gives visually better results.
Equation (20) indicates a phase transition at p̂ = 1/2,
which is visible in Figure 2. That is, in the ER model,
the expected value of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio
becomes negative if p > p̂. In this regime, the fixation
probability of a cooperative mutant is less than that of
neutral drift, regardless of the values of b and c. Hence
natural selection does not favor the fixation of coop-
eration over the fixation of defection for any value of
benefit-to-cost ratio. In this regime, the network pro-
motes spite, which means that players are willing to pay
a cost to reduce the payoff of others. Hence we observe
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
FIG. 3. (Color Online) Accuracy of the proposed mean-field
approximation for b∗ for the example value of p = 0.8, and two
different values of m. The network size is 100. The dashed lines
depict the predicted threshold value q̂ as given by (21), agrees with
the exact results for both settings. For q > q̂, natural selection
promotes fixation of defection over cooperation regardless of the
benefit-to-cost ratio. The intercepts match the result for lim q →
0+ obtained in Equation (22).
a phase transition from cooperation to spite governed by
network density.
For the general case of p 6= q, too, we can find such
a point of transition. We can find q̂ (the critical inter-
community link probability above which natural selec-
tion does not favor fixation of cooperative mutants over
defective mutants regardless of the benefit-to-cost ratio)
by setting the denominator of Equation (19) equal to
zero and solving the resulting quadratic equation for q.
Expanding the solution for large N , we get:
q̂ =
m− 2p
2(m− 1) + 2m
(
1
2 − p
)2
(m− 1)2
1
N
+O
(
1
N2
)
. (21)
This result has an important consequence. Each of the
m communities with intra-community link probability
p considered separately is an ER network, so the ex-
pected value of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for each
of them is given by (20). Suppose the communities have
p > 1/2, which, as discussed above, means that coop-
eration is not favored by natural selection for each indi-
vidual community considered separately. We can then
interconnect these communities under the SBM setting,
with inter-community probability q. For q < q̂, the criti-
cal benefit-to-cost ratio of the overall network is positive,
despite individual communities inhibiting the fixation of
cooperation. This confirms analytically the numerical
observations about conjoining random networks [21].
In Figure 3, we present the comparison of Equa-
tion (19) with the exact results. The orange markers
pertain to the example case of m = 4 and p = 0.8, for
which Equation (21) gives q̂ ≈ 0.4. The blue markers
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FIG. 4. (Color Online) The distribution of the ratio of the
proposed mean-field approximation to the true value of b∗. The
true value is obtained by solving the N(N − 1)/2 linear equations
as given by (8), which is infeasible for very large networks, but
feasible for the size ranges of the test networks. The 10 network
generation families are discussed in the text. Two example graphs
with high heterogeneity are depicted to highlight the robustness of
the proposed mean-field approximation to structural heterogeneity.
pertain to m = 2 and p = 0.8, with q̂ ≈ 0.2. The net-
work size is 100 in both cases. The approximations are
remarkably close to the exact values.
Of particular relevance for actual scenarios is the case
where q  1, which means that the communities are
sparsely interconnected. In this regime, we can expand
b∗ as follows:
b∗ =
N(N − 2)p− 2m(1− p)
N(m− 2p)− 2m(1− p) +O(q). (22)
The interesting result here is the existence of the zeroth-
order term. This fact can be seen in Figure 3 as well.
For N = 100, p = 0.8 with m = 2, from Equation (22)
we get b∗ ≈ 200, and with m = 4 we get b∗ ≈ 32.9.
The inverse of these values are 0.0050 and 0.030, respec-
tively, which correctly match the intercepts observed in
Figure 3. This confirms that in the limit as q → 0+, b∗
tends to a positive number. Thus, sparse interconnec-
tion of cohesive communities rescues cooperation. Note
that this happens as long as the whole network is con-
nected, so that b∗ is well-defined. The minimum value of
q such that the whole network is connected goes to zero
as N tends to infinity.
Returning to arbitrary 2 × 2 games, according to the
Structure Coefficient Theorem, the structure coefficient
is defined in terms of b∗ as follows:
σ =
b∗ + 1
b∗ − 1 . (23)
For the special case of SBM or ER networks, σ can be
obtained readily by inserting the corresponding values of
b∗ from Equations (19) and (20) into (23), respectively.
For general networks, we use the mean-field value for b∗
obtained in (16). The result simplifies to the following:
σ ≈ N(µ1 + 1)− 4µ2/µ1
N(µ1 − 1) . (24)
Natural selection favors the fixation of strategy C over
the fixation of strategy D if (R− P )σ > (T − S). Thus
we have obtained analytical conditions such that natural
selection favors the fixation of one strategy over the other
for any 2× 2 game.
We conclude by highlighting the accuracy of the pro-
posed mean-field approximation for b∗ via simulations
and numerical results for various graph families, in ad-
dition to the SBM and ER models. In Figure 4, we
plot the histogram of the ratio of the approximate b∗
to the exact value (computed via solving the system of
N(N − 1)/2 linear equations as given by (8)) for 10 dif-
ferent network families. In addition to SBM and ER net-
works, we consider the Small-world model, and 7 other
network generation families, which all generate networks
with heavy-tailed degree distribution. We use these ad-
ditional 7 families as pessimistic scenarios regarding our
mean-field approximation, because these models gener-
ate highly-heterogeneous networks. For the SBM model,
we chose m uniformly from {2, 3, 4, 5}, chose p uniformly
in [0.1, 1], and q uniformly in [.01, p]. For the small-world
model [22], we chose the initial lattice degree uniformly
from ×{4, 8, 12} and the link creation probability uni-
formly from [0, 0.1]. For ER networks, we chose the link
formation probability uniformly in [0.2, 1]. For prefer-
ential attachment (PA) with shifted-linear kernel [23]
(also called ‘initial attractiveness’), we randomly gen-
erate m between 1 and 5, and the kernel bias is gen-
erated randomly between 0 and 5 (the closer to zero,
the closer the model is to the Barabasi-Albert model).
For the scale-free model of Holme and Kim (HK) [24],
we chose the triad formation probability of the model
uniformly in [0, 1]. For Klemm-Euigluz (KE) scale-free
model [25], we choose the cross-over probability param-
eter of the model uniformly in [0, 1]. For both models,
we choose the number of initial connections of incoming
nodes uniformly between 1 and 5. For the spatial scale-
free model of Barthelemy [26] (SSL), we generated net-
works on a 2D lattice with distance decay parameter rc
chosen uniformly in [0, 0.2]. For the uncorrelated config-
uration model (UCM) [27], we chose the minimum num-
ber of connections uniformly between 1 and 5, and the
exponent in the power-law degree distribution is chosen
uniformly in [1, 4]. For super-linear preferential attach-
ment [28] (PA:SL), where the attachment kernel depends
on degrees as kθ, we chose the number of initial connec-
tions of incoming nodes uniformly between 1 and 4, and
the exponent of the kernel uniformly in [0, 3]. Greater ex-
ponents produce networks with higher degree inequality.
The LFR benchmarks [29] are generated with the mix-
ing parameter chosen uniformly at random in [0, 1]. The
maximum degree kmax was chosen uniformly between 1
and N − 1, the average degree was chosen uniformly be-
tween 1 and kmax, the degree exponent was uniformly in
[0, 3], the exponent for the community size distribution
6was chosen uniformly in [0, 1]. For each family, we gener-
ate 10000 networks. For every generate network, the size
is randomly chosen between 100 and 500, which is rea-
sonably small so that the exact results could be feasibily
calculated via solving Equation (8). The histograms are
highly concentrated around unity, which confirms the ac-
curacy of the proposed mean-field approximations. In-
terestingly, the proposed approximation works well for
networks with high structural heterogeneity, including
those with heavy-tailed degree distributions.
We presented accurate mean-field solutions for 2 × 2
games on heterogeneous networks that determine which
strategy is favored by natural selection. We have utilized
our solution to study the case of SBM networks in detail,
and have uncovered a network-structural phase transi-
tion which pertains to regions in which one of the strate-
gies will not be favored by natural selection regardless of
the payoff parameters. We have obtained similar results
for ER networks as a special case. We have obtained
analytical expressions for the inter-connection of segre-
gated communities, which individually inhibit cooper-
ation, but after interconnection, can collectively favor
cooperation. This result in agreement with the previous
results in the literature [9, 11], which obtain qualitatively
similar results via various updating schemes and simu-
lation parameters, and even those that consider many-
player games [10]. Our analytical findings together with
the previous simulation studies consistently highlight the
cooperative advantage of sparsely interconnecting cohe-
sive communities, and indicate that this advantage is
a robust feature of cooperative dynamics on networks,
which has notable real-world consequences.
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